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Introduction
This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of environmental economics
and industrial organization. In the rst essay, we develop a two-country world
di¤erential game model with a polluting rm in each country to investigate the
equilibrium of the game between rms when they decide to trade or not and to
see under which conditions social welfare coincides with the market equilibrium.
In the second essay, we built a model where rms strategically choose whether
to participate in an auction/lottery to attain pollution permits, or instead invest
in green R&D, to show that, somewhat counterintuitively, a desirable side e¤ect
of the auction is in fact that of fostering environmental R&D in an admissible
range of the model parameters. The third essay investigates a second-best trade
agreement between two countries when pollution spillovers are asymmetric to
examine the strategic behavior of governments in using pollution taxes and
tari¤s under trade liberalization. The fouth essay studies the protability of
exogenous output constraint in a di¤erential game model with price dynamics
under the feedback strategies.
In the rst chapter, we have theoretically addressed the e¤ects of trade
liberalization in a two country world di¤erential polluting oligopoly game where
there is transportation cost to investigate the equilibrium of the game between
rms when they decide to trade or not and to see under which conditions social
welfare coincides with the market equilibrium. We nd out while in the static
game bilateral trade is always the equilibrium for any acceptable transportation
cost, in the dynamic game social planner can prevent the ine¢ cient outcome
by imposing and determining the proper amount of corrective taxation. We
v
vi
gure out the market equilibrium under the open-loop and feedback strategies
and determine which one of the three cases of bilateral trade, unilateral trade
or autarchy is the equilibrium of the game between two rms according to the
amount of transportation cost and corrective tax. Then, we determine the
extent of tax amount for various quantities of negative externality to which
social welfare coincides with market equilibrium.
In the second chapter, we examine the welfare implications of trade liberal-
ization when governments behave strategically using environmental policy with
asymmetric pollution spillovers. We investigated a second-best trade agreement
between two countries to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using
pollution taxes and tari¤s under trade liberalization.
We found that when the marginal cost of pollution of the domestic rm
increases, the pollution-shifting motive is enhanced and government wants to
raise production taxes and surprisingly the rent-seeking behavior is observed
and government raises import tari¤s. On the other hand, when the marginal
cost of pollution of the foreign rm increases, government want to reduce the
level of tax and interestingly the level of tari¤ as well.
The third chapter is on non-tradable pollution permit and incentives for in-
vestments in green technologies. Acquired wisdom has it that the allocation of
pollution rights to rms hinders their willingness to undertake uncertain R&D
projects for environmental-friendly technologies. We revisit this issue in a model
where rms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction/lottery to
attain pollution permits, or instead invest in green R&D, to show that, some-
what counterintuitively, a desirable side e¤ect of the auction is in fact that of
fostering environmental R&D in an admissible range of the model parameters.
Finally, in the last chapter, we investigate the protability of exogenous
output constraints. In a series of papers Gaudet and Salant (1991a,b) show
that, in the case of Cournot competition among producers of perfect substitutes,
a marginal contraction is strictly benecial if and only if the number of rms
in the designated subset exceeds the "adjusted" number of rms outside it by
vii
strictly more than one. In the special case of linear cost and demand functions,
the rms in the subset will gain from an exogenously marginal contraction of
their output if and only if they outnumber the rms outside the subset by more
than one.
In this paper we generalize this result to the case of dynamic competition
instead of looking at the one-shot game. While in the standard Cournot model
any output constraint is not to the benet of constrained rms, in this paper,
we show that when rms play a dynamic Cournot game with Markov-perfect
strategies, exogenous output constraint by a subset of rms results in: (i) in-
crease in the value of unconstraint rms irrelevant of the amount of constraint
because of having less intensive competition, (ii) increase in the market price for
any output constraint below the optimal level and slightly above that because
of lowering the total output caused by less competition and (iii) increase in the
value of constrained rms for a viable range of parameters and initial conditions
because of increasing the price during the price path. Our analysis has some ap-
plications to voluntary export restraints (VER), Mergers, Economics Sanctions,
etc.
viii
Part I
Essays in Environmental
Economics
1

Chapter 1
A Dynamic Approach to
the Environmental E¤ects
of Trade Liberalization
1.1 Introduction
Controlling the emission of environment-damaging pollution caused by increased
economic activity has received a considerable attention in the eld of environ-
mental economics. Given that the pollution function is increasing in the output
of the industry, we have the usual trade-o¤ between the price e¤ect and the
negative externality. If we restrict the output the environment is cleaner but
the price is higher.
International trade is playing an important role in expanding global economic
activities and there is an increasing amount of literature regarding trade and the
environment in trade theory1 . However, there are not too many contributions
regarding the e¤ects of trade liberalization in a dynamic context. What creates
negative externality is the stock of pollution not just the current emission of
pollution. Thus, we need a dynamic model to study the environmental e¤ect
of trade liberalization due to the fact that pollution is accumulated over time.
Fujiwara (2009) investigates the e¤ects of free trade on global stock of pollution
using a two country di¤erential game model. We develop a two-country world
1See Copeland and Taylor (2003), Antweiler et al. (2001), inter alia.
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di¤erential game model, where there is a polluting rm in each country, to
derive the open-loop and feedback equilibria of the game between rms in case
of autarky, unilateral and bilateral trade when there is transportation cost and
also a Pigouvian tax is introduced to reduce damaging emissions.
Most of the existing contributions in the eld of environmental economics
examine the existence of Pigouvian taxation aimed at inducing rms to reduce
damaging emissions directly2 or indirectly3 . Accordingly, the common approach
to deal with this problem in all of these studies is to derive the rst best, where
a social planner chooses a welfare maximizing production plan, and introduce
corrective taxes to induce prot-seeking rms to produce at socially optimum
level. In our study, the game between social planners is not technically solv-
able. As a result, it is not possible to outline the social optimum. However,
we gure out the market equilibrium and determine which one of the three
cases of bilateral trade, unilateral trade or autarky is the equilibrium of the
game between two rms according to the transportation cost and Pigouvian tax
quantity. Then, we determine the extent of tax amount for various quantities of
negative externality to which social welfare coincides with market equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 constructs a
basic model. Section 3 briey outlines the static version of the game. In section
4, the di¤erential game is illustrated and the open-loop and feedback equilibria
under autarky, unilateral and bilateral trade are characterized. Prots and
social welfares are assessed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1.2 The Setup
There are two similar countries, indexed by i = 1; 2. In each country there is
a rm which produces a single output. Firms supply a homogenous good and
2See Bergstrom et al. (1981), Karp and Livernois (1992, 1994), Benchekroun and Long
(1998, 2002) and Tsur and Zemel (2008).
3To this regard, see Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Damania
(1996), Chiou and Hu (2001) and Tsur and Zemel (2002), Dragone et al. (2009).
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their productions, qi, have two parts:
qi = qii + qij ; i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
where qii and qij denote the amounts of output produced by rm i and consumes
in domestic market and is exported to the other country, respectively. It is
obvious that the second part becomes zero if there isnt any export.
Exporting rm must pay an iceberg transportation cost which depends on
the amount of export. In our setting, m 2 (0; 1] captures the e¤ect of trans-
portation cost. If there is no transportation cost, m is equal to one. Therefore,
the inverse demand function in each country is
pi = a  (qii +mqji); i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
where qji is the amount of goods which is exported by the rm j into country i.
Technology is the same for both rms and production takes place at constant
returns to scale (CRS), with a constant marginal cost c. It is summarized by
the cost function Ci = cqi(t). Hence, rm is instantaneous prots are
i (t) = pi (t) qii (t) + pj (t)mqij (t)  cqi (t) :
The production of the nal output creates a negative externality in the form
of polluting emissionsow which we assume E(t) = Q(t), and it increases the
stock of pollution, Z. Pollution is accumulated over time and is transboundary.
The accumulation process of the world pollutant follows:
_Z (t) =
2P
i=1
qi (t)  kZ (t) ; k > 0; (1.1)
where k is the natural purication rate of the pollutant.
The stock of pollution lowers the consumer surplus by the following rule:
CSi (t) =
(qii (t) +mqji (t))
2
2
  hZ (t)
2
2
; h > 0;
where h measures the e¤ect of negative externality on consumers. However, the
instantaneous social welfare in each country is the aggregate amount of rms
prots and consumer surplus:
SWi (t) = i (t) + CSi (t) . (1.2)
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By knowing this setting, we are deriving rms prot equilibria in autarky,
unilateral and bilateral trade. We will compare these prots as well as social
welfares to obtain the trade strategy from the viewpoints of the both, the social
planner and the rms.
1.3 The Static Problem
As a preliminary step, in this section, we consider the static Cournot game in
order to examine the case where rms maximize their prot functions without
taking into account the negative externality because of the lack of corrective
tax. We consider the game in gure 1 in which rms make their trade strategy
decision, where Ai , 
T
i (
NT
i ) and 
BT
i denote the optimal prot of rm i in the
case of autarky, trade (not trade) in unilateral and bilateral trade, respectively.
Figure 1.1: The game between two rms when they decide to trade (T) or not
(NT).
In autarky case, there is no trade between the two countries and each rm is
monopolist in its own country with the optimal quantity level of (a  c) =2. In
the unilateral and bilateral trade where rms play à la Cournot, the equilibrium
amount of outputs is summarized in lemma 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium amounts of rmsoutput in unilateral trade in the
static Cournot competition is
qTii =
a  c
2
; qTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
;
qNTjj =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
:
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Proof. The maximization problem of trading and not trading rms are
Ti = max
qii;qij
(a  qii)qii + (a  qjj  mqij)(mqij)  c(qii + qij); (1.3)
NTj = max
qjj
(a  qjj  mqij)qjj   cqjj ; (1.4)
with the following rst-order conditions (FOCs):
@Ti
@qii
= a  2qii   c = 0; (1.5)
@Ti
@qij
= am mqjj   2m2qij   c = 0; (1.6)
@NTi
@qjj
= a  2qjj  mqij   c = 0: (1.7)
Consequently, the resulting levels of individual output are
qTii =
a  c
2
; qTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
; qNTjj =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
:
Lemma 2 The equilibrium in bilateral trade under static Cournot competition
is
qBTii =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
; qBTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
:
Proof. The maximization problem of rms in case of bilateral trade, which is
the same for both because of symmetry, would be
BTi = max
qii;qij
(a  qii  mqji)qii + (a  qjj  mqij)(mqij)  c(qii + qij): (1.8)
The rst order conditions of this problem w.r.t. controls are
@BTi
@qii
= a  2qii  mqji   c = 0; (1.9)
@BTi
@qij
= am mqjj   2m2qij   c = 0; (1.10)
which leads to this solution:
qBTii =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
; qBTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
:
Comparing the corresponding prots on autarky, unilateral and bilateral
trade, it is clear that Ti > 
A
i , 
BT
i > 
NT
i and 
A
i > 
BT
i . Therefore:
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Proposition 3 Under the static framework trade is dominant strategy for both
rms and (T; T ) is the Nash equilibrium of the game where rms decide to trade
or not. This is a prisoners dilemma game.
Proof. This follows from equilibrium in autarky and lemmas 1 and 2.
Now, we are interested in welfare comparison across the four cases which is
summarized in:
Corollary 4 Under the static framework bilateral trade is welfare improving if
and only if
h <
k2m2(5am+ c(17m  22))
4(m  2)(c(4 +m( 4 + 7m))  am(2 + 5m)) ; (1.11)
which coincides the equilibrium of the rms game. Otherwise, social welfare
has higher value in the case of autarky.
Proof. By plugging qii, qij , qjj and qji into the stationary condition _Z = 0, the
steady state stock of pollution is obtained which in turn can be plugged into
(1.2) in order to get social welfare amounts in autarky, unilateral and bilateral
trade. Comparing the acquired welfares, we obtain the inequality.
Corollary 5 The less transportation cost is, the more bilateral trade is socially
preferable.
Proof. The right hand side of the inequality (1.11) is increasing in m which
means in order for bilateral trade becomes socially acceptable, h can have a
larger value when transportation cost decreases. This concludes the proof.
However, trade liberalization would increase rms output which has two
contradictory e¤ects on consumer surplus. Output increase, on the one hand,
would directly raise consumer surplus, on the other hand, increases the stock
of pollution which in turn reduces consumer surplus. Now, if inequality (1.11)
holds or in the other words h is small enough, pollution increase does not re-
duce the consumer surplus too much and consumers will benet from output
enlargement.
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1.4 The Dynamic Game
As it is said before, the production of nal output creates a cross-boundary
negative externality which is accumulated over time and follows the dynamic
(4.31). Now, by introducing a corrective (Pigouvian) tax, in quadratic form, the
rms are forced to internalize the negative externality of pollution in a dynamic
framework. Therefore, the rm is optimization problem is formulated as:
max
qi
i 
Z 1
0
e rt
h
pi qii + pj mqij   c (qii + qij)  s
2
Z2
i
dt; (1.12)
subject to (4.31) and Z(0) = Z0. Parameter r > 0 is a constant rate of discount
common to all rms and parameter s is a policy instrument that policy maker
by manipulating it modies taxation. This taxation is not the same if rms play
open-loop or feedback.
In the remainder of this section, the problem is solved for the open-loop
equilibrium and feedback equilibrium as well.
1.4.1 Open-Loop Solution
Here we characterize the open-loop equilibria of the three cases, starting with
the autarky which is the simplest one because there is only one supplier in each
country.
Proposition 6 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium under autarky, the steady
state levels of the price and the individual output are
pOLAi = a  qOLAii ; qOLAii =
k(a  c)(k + r)
2(k(k + r) + s)
;
where OLA denotes the open-loop equilibrium at autarky. Such a steady state
is saddle point stable.
Proof. The Hamiltonian equation of rm i is:
HAi (t) = e
 t
n
qii(t) (a  qii (t)  c)  s
2
Z2(t) (1.13)
+ i(t) [qii(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]
o
;
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where i(t) = i (t) e
t and i (t) is the co-state variable associated with Z(t).
Consider the rst-order condition w.r.t. qii(t):
@HAi (t)
@qii(t)
= a  2qii (t)  c+ i(t) = 0: (1.14)
This yields the optimal open-loop output for the rm i as follows4 :
qii (t) =
 1
2 (a  c+ i(t)) if a > c  i(t);
0 otherwise.
(1.15)
The adjoint equation for the optimum is
@i(t)
@t
= ri(t)  @H
A
i (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)i(t) + sZ (t) ; (1.16)
and the associated transversality condition is
lim
t!1i (t) :Z (t) = 0:
Di¤erentiating (1.15), using (1.16) and symmetry assumption, we obtain
dq (t)
dt
 _q (t) = 1
2
[(k + r)(t) + sZ (t)] : (1.17)
From (1.14), we know
(t) =  a+ 2q (t) + c:
By substituting this into (1.17), we have
_q (t) =  1
2
[(k + r) (a  2q (t)  c)  sZ (t)] : (1.18)
Therefore, the dynamic system can be rewritten in matrix form as follows:
_q
_Z

=

k + r s2
2  k
 
q
Z

+
  12 (k + r) (a  c)
0

: (1.19)
Since the determinant of the above two-by-two matrix is negative, the equilib-
rium point is a saddle, with
pOLAi = a  qOLAii ; qOLAii =
k(a  c)(k + r)
2(k(k + r) + s)
:
4 In the remainder, we consider the positive solution.
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Proposition 7 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium under unilateral trade, the
steady state levels of the price and the individual outputs are
pOLTi = a  qOLTii ; pOLNTj = a  qOLNTjj  mqOLTij ;
qOLTii =
3km2(a  c)(k + r) + a(m  2)(m  1)s
6km2(k + r) + (4 +m(7m  4))s ; (1.20)
qOLTij =
2k(c(m  2) + am)(k + r) + 4a(m  1)s
6km2(k + r) + (4 +m(7m  4))s ;
qOLNTjj =
2km(am+ c  2cm)(k + r)  a(m2 +m  2)s
6km2(k + r) + (4 +m( 4 + 7m))s ;
where OLT and OLNT denote the open-loop equilibrium in unilateral trade for
trading and not trading rms, respectively. Such a steady state is saddle point
stable.
Proof. In unilateral trade, only one rm exports. The Hamiltonian for the
trading and not trading rms are
HTi (t) = e
 t
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(1.21)
+ i(t) [qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]
o
;
HNTj (t) = e
 t
nh
pj(t)qjj   cqj   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(1.22)
+ j(t) [qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]
o
:
The rst-order necessary conditions w.r.t. control variables, adjoint equations
and associated transversality conditions for the optimum are
@HTi (t)
@qii(t)
= a  2qii (t)  c+ i(t) = 0; (1.23)
@HTi (t)
@qij(t)
= am  2m2qij (t) mqjj (t)  c+ i(t) = 0; (1.24)
@HNTi (t)
@qjj(t)
= a  2qjj (t) mqij (t)  c+ j(t) = 0; (1.25)
@i(t)
@t
= ri(t)  @H
T
i (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)i(t) + sZ (t) ; (1.26)
@j(t)
@t
= rj(t) 
@HNTj (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)j(t) + sZ (t) ; (1.27)
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lim
t!1i (t) :Z (t) = 0; limt!1j (t) :Z (t) = 0:
Di¤erentiating FOCs w.r.t. time and using adjoint equations we obtain the
following control dynamical system:8<: _qii (t) =  
1
2 [(k + r) (a  2qii (t)  c)  sZ (t)] ;
_qij (t) =   13m2 [(k + r) (m (a  3mqij (t) + c)  2c)  s (2 m)Z (t)] ;
_qjj (t) =   13m [(k + r) (am  3mqjj (t)  c(2m  1))  s(2m  1)Z (t)] :
(1.28)
Solving (1.28) together with (4.31), yields the stable steady state equilibrium
point in (1.20).
Proposition 8 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium under bilateral trade, the
steady state levels of the price and the individual outputs are
pOLBTi = a  qOLBTii  mqOLBTji ;
qOLBTii =
km(am+ c  2cm)(k + r) + 2a(1 m)s
3km2(k + r) + 4(m(m  1) + 1)s ; (1.29)
qOLBTij =
k(c(m  2) + am)(k + r) + 2a(m  1)s
3km2(k + r) + 4(m(m  1) + 1)s :
where OLBT denotes the open-loop equilibrium at bilateral trade. Such a steady
state is saddle point stable.
Proof. As mentioned before, the two rms and two countries are symmetric.
Then, the Hamiltonian function of each rm in bilateral trade is
HBTi (t) = e
 t
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(1.30)
+ i(t) [qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  qji(t)  kZ(t)]
o
:
Considering the rst-order conditions, adjoint equations and associated transver-
sality conditions:
@HBTi (t)
@qii(t)
= a  2qii (t) mqji (t)  c+ i(t) = 0;
@HBTi (t)
@qij(t)
= m (a  2mqij (t)  qjj (t))  c+ i(t) = 0;
@i(t)
@t
= ri(t)  @H
BT
i (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)i(t) + sZ (t) ;
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lim
t!1i (t) :Z (t) = 0;
yields the dynamics of rm is controls:
_qii (t) =   13m [(k + r) (am  3mqii (t)  c(2m  1))  s(2m  1)Z (t)] ;
_qij (t) =   13m2 [(k + r) (m (a  3mqij (t) + c)  2c)  s (2 m)Z (t)] :
(1.31)
Solving (1.31) accompanied by the dynamics of rm js control variables and
(4.31), fully characterizes the stable steady state equilibrium point in (1.29).
1.4.2 Feedback Solution
Here, we characterize a subgame perfect Cournot equilibrium in Markov strate-
gies where rms employ pollution dependent decision rules when maximizing
their discounted prot. Therefore, changes in the stock of pollution stimulate
responses, through Pigouvian tax, by all players that are reected in their quan-
tity choices.
Proposition 9 At the feedback Nash equilibrium under autarky, the steady state
levels of the price and the individual output are
pFAi = a  qFAii ; qFAii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eAZ + fA ;
where FA denotes the feedback equilibrium at autarky and
eA =
1
3

2k + r  
p
(2k + r)2 + 6s

;
fA =
2(a  c)eA
2(k + r)  3eA :
Proof. The Bellman equation of rm i in autarky is
rVi (Z (t)) = max
qii(t)
n
qii(t) [pi(t)  c]  s
2
Z2(t) (1.32)
+
@Vi (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]

;
where Vi (Z (t)) is the value function of rm i. Given the linear quadratic form
of the maximand, we assume the quadratic value function:
Vi (Z) =
ei
2
Z2 + fiZ + gi; (1.33)
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so that
@Vi (Z)
@Z
= eiZ + fi: (1.34)
where ei, fi and gi are unknown coe¢ cients and the indication of time is omitted
to ease the exposition. Taking the FOC w.r.t. qii and using (1.34), we obtain:
qFAii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eAZ + fA ; pFAi = a  qFAii ; (1.35)
where eA and fA can be calculated by using (1.35) and rewriting (1.32) as
follows:
1Z
2 + 2Z + 3 = 0; (1.36)
where
1 =
1
4

e(3eA   4k   2r)  2s ; (1.37)
2 =
1
4

4eA(a  c) + 2fA(3eA   2 (k + r)) ; (1.38)
3 =
1
4

(a  c)2 + fA(4 (a  c) + 3fA)  4gAr : (1.39)
Equation (1.36) is satised if expressions (1.37)-(1.39) are simultaneously zero.
This results to the following solution:
eA =
1
3

2k + r  
p
(2k + r)2 + 6s

;
fA =
2(a  c)eA
2(k + r)  3eA :
Proposition 10 At the feedback Nash equilibrium under unilateral trade, the
steady state levels of the prices and the individual outputs are
pFTi = a  qFTii ; pFNTj = a  qFNTjj  mqFTij ;
qFTii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eTZFT + fT  ;
qFTij =
(2 m)(eTZFT + fT   c) + am
3m2
;
qFNTjj =
c+m(a  2c) + (2m  1)(eTZFT + fT )
3m
;
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where FT and FNT denote the feedback equilibrium in unilateral trade for trad-
ing and not trading rm and
eT =
9m2(2k + r)  3p9m4(2k + r)2 + 2m2(16 +m(37m  28))s
16 +m(37m  28) ;
fT =
eT (c(16 +m(25m  22))  am(11m+ 8))
eT (16 +m(37m  28))  18m2(k + r) :
Proof. The Bellman equations of trading and not trading rms in unilateral
trade are5 :
rVi (Z (t)) = max
qi(t)
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(1.40)
+
@Vi (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]

;
rVj (Z (t)) = max
qj(t)
nh
pj(t)qjj   cqj   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(1.41)
+
@Vj (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]

;
with the same value function form that was introduced before. Taking the FOCs
w.r.t. controls and using (1.34), we obtain:
qFTii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eTZFT + fT  ; (1.42)
qFTij =
1
2m2
 
am  c+ eTZFT + fT  mqFNTjj

; (1.43)
qFNTjj =
1
2
 
a  c+ eTZFT + fT  mqFTij

: (1.44)
By solving (1.43) and (1.44) simultaneously, the amounts of qFTij and q
FNT
jj is
taken. Using these and rewriting (1.40) or (1.41) as (1.36) and as the same
procedure as the previous proof, we can calculate eT and fT .
Proposition 11 At the feedback Nash equilibrium under bilateral trade, the
steady state levels of the price and the individual outputs are
pFBTi = a  qFBTii  mqFBTji ;
qFBTii =
c+m(a  2c) + (fBT + eBT z)(2m  1)
3m
;
5We omit the full calculations but they are available upon request.
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qFBTij =
(2 m)(eBTZFBT + fBT   c) + am
3m2
;
ZFBT =
2(am(m+ 1) + 2(fBT   c)(m(m  1) + 1))
3km2   4eBT (m(m  1) + 1) ;
where FBT denotes the feedback equilibrium in bilateral trade and
eBT =
9m2(2k + r) p81m4(2k + r)2 + 36m2(22  28m+ 22m2)s
2(22  28m+ 22m2) ;
fBT =
eBT (m2(5a  16c) +m(5a+ 22c)  16c)
9m2(k + r)  eBT (22  28m+ 22m2) :
Proof. When there is trade between two countries, the Bellman equation of
rm i is
rVi (Z (t)) = max
qi(t)
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(1.45)
+
@Vi (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  qji(t)  kZ(t)]

:
Taking the rst order necessary conditions and using the similar procedure with
the previous proofs leads to nd the Nash equilibrium of the game in bilateral
trade6 .
Remark 12 The parameter m must be belong to (m
¯
; 1] in which m
¯
is
-
2c
a+ c
in the static game,
-
2ck(k + r) + 2as
k(a+ c)(k + r) + 2as
in the open-loop equilibrium,
- the positive root of k (f   c) (2 m) + a (km+ 2e (1 m)) = 0 in the feedback equilibrium where
(e; f) is equal to
 
eT ; fT

and
 
eBT ; fBT

for unilateral and bilateral trade,respectively,
otherwise rms do not have an incentive to trade due to high transportation
cost. This results from the condition qij > 0.
Corollary 13 In the dynamic equilibria, the maximum acceptable transporta-
tion cost decreases when s increases and in the limit when s goes to innity, it
must be zero.
Proof. Di¤erentiating m
¯
, illustrated in remark 8, in the open-loop and the
feedback equilibria w.r.t. s we found that @m¯@s > 0. Thus, increasing s leads to
increasing the minimum acceptable value of m or in the other word lowering the
maximum rate of tranpostation cost by which trade is doable.
6The full calculations are available upon request.
1.5. Prot and Welfare Assessment 17
Figure 1.2: (a) Prot comparison according to the level of transportation cost
and tax rate under the feedback information; (b) welfare comparison according
to the level of negative externality and tax rate under the open-loop information
1.5 Prot and Welfare Assessment
In this section, by using equilibrium values, we compare rmsprots in autarky,
unilateral and bilateral trade to determine the equilibrium of the game between
rms where they decide to trade or not, in the open-loop and in the feedback
solutions. In addition, we will look into the case which leads to the e¢ cient
level of social welfare.
Because of having too many parameters, comparing the results is di¢ cult.
Therefore, we use a numerical analysis to assess the prots and welfares in the
three cases for the open-loop and the feedback equilibria, respectively. In our
setting, the parameters a; c; k and r are given and in the remainder we assume
that they have denite and plausible values of 10; 0; 0:5 and 0:05, respectively.
In gure 2a, the prots of rms in di¤erent cases, under open-loop equilibria,
is compared according to the amounts of transportation cost and Pigouvian tax.
As it can be seen in this gure, the equilibrium of the game illustrated in gure 1
depends on the amounts ofm and s. In the region below the curve, trade is dom-
inant strategy for both rms which leads to the equilibrium
 
OLBT1 ; 
OLBT
2

and due to the fact that in this region the prot of rms in autarky is greater
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Figure 1.3: (a) Prot comparison according to the level of transportation cost
and tax rate under the feedback information; (b) welfare comparison according
to the level of negative externality and tax rate under the feedback information
than bilateral trade, this game is a prisoners dilemma. In the region above the
curve, the condition of remark 8 is not satised. Therefore, non of them choose
trade strategy and
 
OLA1 ; 
OLA
2

is the equilibrium of the game.
Figure 2b depicts the regions that conditioned on the value of parameters h,
s and m bilateral trade (autarky) becomes the preferable case from the social
welfare point of view. In this gure, for m = 1, the solid line divides the region
of parameters h and s into two areas where in the upper region bilateral trade
is socially preferable and in the lower area autarky. The dashed line does the
same but form =m
¯
. For any other amount ofm we have an analogous boderline
between the solid and the dash lines. As it can be seen in the gure, when m
decreases the area where bilateral trade is socially e¢ cient shrinks. However,
depending on the amount of existing h, policy maker can determine tax rate in
such a way that either bilateral trade or autarky become socially e¢ cient.
Figure 3a compares the prots of rms in di¤erent cases according to the
amounts of transportation cost and Pigouvian tax for feedback information. As
it can be seen in this gure, in region I, where m is close to one and s is not too
large, trade is dominant strategy for both rms which leads to the equilibrium 
FBT1 ; 
FBT
2

. In this region the prot of rms in autarky is greater than
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bilateral trade, therefore, this equilibrium is not pareto e¢ cient. In region II,
there is not any unique equilibrium and rms play a chicken game. If rms play
simultaneously, they make a systematic mistake to reach the equilibrium, and
if they play sequentially, the problem is who plays rst and gains the enormous
benets of the trade. In the last region, III, because of high transportation cost,
trade is not possible and autarky is the equilibrium.
In gure 3b, it is shown that which one of the three cases (autarky, unilateral
and bilateral trade) is socially e¢ cient according to the amounts of negative
externality and corrective tax rate. Similar to gure 2b the solid line is for
m = 1 and the dashed line is for m =m
¯
. In the region above the curves,
bilateral trade is e¢ cient from the social planner point of view. In the other
region autarky is socially e¢ cient. Note that in some situations unilateral trade
can be the e¢ cient case socially. It means that if what one country gains is
more than what the other looses, over all, they gain. But this makes a huge
coordination problem. The problem is that which country accepts not to sell
to the other country. In this case, there should be a side payment. Hence,
unilateral trade is very hard to sustain.
However, if the social planner makes a deal about taxation, he makes a deal
about s as well and this deal is di¤erent if he knows rms are playing open-loop
equilibrium or feedback equilibrium.
Consequently, if rms play under the open-loop strategies, in order for the
socially e¢ cient equilibrium coincides with the market equilibrium, according
to the amounts of h and m,social planner must determine s in a way that it
characterizes a point in the lower (upper) region of gure 2a and the uper (lower)
region in gure 2b. The most e¢ cient point for the welfare (if it is applicable)
takes place on the dividing curves (depended on m) in gure 2b.
If rms play under the feedback rule, bilateral trade can be the most prefer-
able case if social planner can determine the tax rate, according to the amounts
of h and m, in a way that it characterizes a point in region I of gure 3a and
the upper region in gure 3b. Otherwise, he must choose s such that the equi-
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librium characterizes a point in region III of gure 3a and the lower region in
gure 3b where autarky is the preferable case.
However, it is not clear to social planners whether rms are playing open-
loop or feedback. Considering the gure 2, if social planners assume that rms
are playing under open-loop equilibrium and they determine s in order to in-
duce bilateral trade, they may face an unexpected outcome. Because if rms
are playing feedback instead of open-loop, autarky may be welfare improving
provided that the point places in the region above the curve in gure 2b and
below the curve in gure 3b. Therefore, to avoid this problem policy makers
must determine s for any given exogenous pair of (h; s) to satisfy the stricter
constraint.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have theoretically addressed e¤ects of trade liberalization
in a two country world di¤erential polluting oligopoly game. We found out
when rms decide to trade or not, if the transportation cost is not too large,
under the open-loop information they play a prisoners dilemma in which trade
is the dominant strategy for both otherwise they play autarky. In order for
trade to be dominant strategy in feedback information, the Pigouvian tax and
transportation cost must have relatively lower values. For larger amounts of
transportation cost and corrective tax, the equilibrium can be unilateral trade
or autarky.
By comparing social welfares in autarky, unilateral and bilateral trade, we
showed that, depending on the e¤ects of negative externality on consumer and
the transportation cost, policy maker can determine the amount of Pigouvian
tax so that market equilibrium coincides with socially e¢ cient equilibrium. This
taxation is di¤erent if rms are playing open-loop equilibrium as compare to the
feedback equilibrium.
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Chapter 2
Strategic environmental
policies under international
competition with
asymmetric pollution
spillovers
2.1 Introduction
The environmental consequences of trade liberalization have received a consid-
erable attention in trade theory and environmental economics. International
trade is playing an important role in expanding global economic activities and,
therefore, many individuals have argued that trade liberalization will lead to an
increase in world pollution.
Although globalization brings about many benets and opportunities, some
environmentalists have resisted freer trade, because governments which are un-
able to use trade policy may lower their environmental standards to give com-
petitive advantage to existing domestic industries and protect their economy.
This has led some economists to investigate the relationship between trade and
the environment.1
The established literature on trade and environment suggests that, while
1Copeland and Taylor (2003) provides a comprehensive review of the link between trade
and the environment.
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each country can gain from trade, it expands global pollution. Fujiwara (2009)
investigates the e¤ects of free trade on global stock of pollution and he nds
that under trade liberalization the stock of pollution is larger as compared to
the autarky.
Another part of the literature deals with the links between strategic environ-
mental policies and the patterns of trade and pollution levels. Stem from the
Brander and Spencer (1985) model, Rauscher (1994), Kennedy (1994), Barrett
(1994), Walz and Wellisch (1997) and Tanguay (2001) all show that governments
can have incentives to use environmental policies to subsidize their exports. It
is benecial for rent-shifting governments to set an environmental tax below
the Pigouvian level in an international oligopoly. Such a weak environmental
regulation to support domestic rms has been called ecological dumping.
The aim of this study is to examine the welfare implications of trade liber-
alization when governments behave strategically using environmental policy in
the presence of transboundary pollution. However, we model the transbound-
ary pollution in such a way that it allows drawing the results also in pure local
pollution and global environmental problem.
In this paper, we consider two symmetric countries with a single rm in
each producing a homogenous good. The two rms may export a part of their
production to the other country. In our model trade of the same product occurs
between countries.2 Thereby, we have a two-stage game where in the rst stage
governments decide about the environmental and trade policies, and the two
rms compete a la Cournot in the second stage. The most important di¤erence
of this study with the aforementioned literature is that we allow for assymetric
environmental damages between the two countries in our model.
We nd that when the marginal cost of pollution of the domestic rm in-
creases, the pollution-shifting motive is enhanced and government wants to raise
production taxes and the rent-seeking behavior is observed and government
2Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) showed that intraindustry trade occurs
because each rm perceives each country as a separate market and makes distinct output
decisions for each.
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raises import tari¤s. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of pollution of
the foreign rm increases, government want to reduce the level of tax and the
level of tari¤ as well.
In addition, contrary to existing literature, it is shown that the global pollu-
tion decreases in bilateral trade compared to autarky provided that the di¤er-
ence between the emission rates of the two rms is su¢ ciently large. This result
holds even for the case of pure local pollution. Furthermore, it is shown that
how the asymmetric pollution emissions a¤ects the rmsprot and countries
welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the general
framework of the model and describes autarkic equilibria. Section 3 devoted to
the rms equilibrium. In Section 4 we turn to the games between the two
governments. Comparing the trade equilibria with the autarkic equilibria takes
place in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 The fundamentals
2.2.1 The setup
There are two countries, indexed by i = 1; 2. In each country there is a rm
which produces a single output. Their productions, qi, have two parts:
qi = qhi + qei; i; j = 1; 2;
where qhi and qei denote the amounts of output produced by rm i and consumes
in the domestic market and is exported to the other country, respectively.
The inverse demand function in each country is
pi = a  (qhi + qej); i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
where qej is the amount of good which is exported by the rm j into country i.
Production takes place at constant returns to scale (CRS), with a constant
marginal cost c which is summarized by the cost function Ci = cqi(t).
The production of rm i, qi, creates a constant per unit emission level, i.
While rms are homogenous in their cost functions, it is assumed that they are
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hetrogeneous in their environmental damage functions, Ei
Ei(qi) = iqi = i (qhi + qei) ; i; j = 1; 2;
which is not conned to the country where the production takes place and gives
rise to a transboundary pollution problem.
The foreign production results in a negative externality in home country at
the xed level  , per unit of its environmental damage. Hence, the negative
externality caused by home and foreign production in country i is
exi(qi; qj) = Ei(qi) +  Ej(qj):
where  2 [0; 1], and  = 0 denotes the case of pure local pollution and  = 1
denotes the case of pure global environmental problem.
In order to protect the environment, country i levies an environmental tax,
 i, on its polluting production and imposes a tari¤ , i,on imported items.
Hence, rm is instantaneous prots are
i = piqhi + pjqei   cqi    iqi   jqei; i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
Tax revenues are distributed in the form of a lump sum to the consumers. Thus,
the social welfare in each country is the aggregate amount of rms prots, con-
sumer surplus, tax and tari¤ revenues minus negative environmental externality
caused by home and foreign rms productions:
Wi = i + CSi +  iqi + iqej   exi; (2.1)
where CSi = (qhi + qej)
2
=2:
2.2.2 The autarkic equilibrium
Now, we consider a closed economy where there is no trade between countries
and each rm is monopolist in its own country. Therefore, given the government
environmental policy  i, the rm i maximizes her monopolistic prot i =
piqi   cqi    iqi, i = 1; 2. By rst-order condition (FOC), we obtain qAi =
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1
2 (a  c   i) where the superscript A denotes the autarky. At the equilibrium,
rm is reaction to the tax policy is @qAi =@ i =  1=2.
In the autarky, the governments rst-best environmental policy is intro-
duced by the Pigovian tax Ai = i. Note that because of transboundary pol-
lution, the foreign rms production creates negative externality in the home
country but it is not a¤ected by the home government policy.
Therefore, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the autarky is
qAi =
1
2
(a  c  i) ; (2.2)
Ai =
1
4
(a  c  i)2 ; (2.3)
WAi =
3
8
(a  c  i)2  
1
2
 j
 
a  c  j

; (2.4)
EAi =
1
2
i (a  c  i) ; (2.5)
exAi = E
A
i +  E
A
j =
1
2

(a  c)  i +  j  2i    2j ; (2.6)
exAG = ex
A
i + ex
A
j =
1
2
(1 +  )

(a  c)  i + j  2i   2j ; j 6= i; (2.7)
where G denotes the global negative environmental externality.
2.3 Trade liberalization
In this section, we want to investigate the rms behavior and governvent policies
after trade liberalization. In what follows, we construct a two-stage game. In
the rst stage, governments determine the level of tax and tari¤ and in the
second stage, the two rms simultaneously choose their outputs.
2.3.1 The rmsequilibrium
By backward induction, we rst solve the two international Cournot competitors
problem when choosing their export and home production levels, qej and qhi
respectively. The problem facing rm i is
max
qhi;qei
i = (a  qhi   qej) qhi + (a  qhj   qei   j) qei   (c+  i) (qhi + qei) ;
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Taking the FOCs, we obtain the following reaction functions
@i
@qhi
= a  2qhi   qej   c   i = 0;
@i
@qei
= a  qhj   2qei   c   i   j = 0:
Solving the FOCs of both rms simultaneously, we nd
qCNhi =
1
3
(a  c  2 i +  j + i) ; (2.8)
qCNei =
1
3
(a  c  2 i +  j   2j) ; (2.9)
where CN denotes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. From equations (2.8)-(2.9)
it is found that @qCNhi =@ i = @q
CN
ei =@ i =  2=3 < @qAi =@ i =  1=2, which
implies that, rst, the rm i reacts to the tax levied by the home government
by reducing her output and, second, this reaction is stronger compared to the
autarky. However, the rm reaction to the foreign tax is opposite. As the foreign
government increases the tax rate, the domestic rm enhances her output, i.e.
@qCNhi =@ j = @q
CN
ei =@ j > 0.
Furthermore, the level of import decreases as the government of the home
country increases the level of tari¤ (@qCNej =@i < 0), and, consequently, the
home rms production increases (@qCNhi =@i > 0).
2.3.2 The noncooperative government policies
Now, knowing the rms behavior in the second stage, we move to the rst
stage where the environmental taxes and tari¤s are determined by governments
as Stackelberg strategic leaders. The total welfare of each country is dened as
the summation of consumer surplus, the rms prots, tax and tari¤ revenues
minus the negative environmental externality caused by both home and foreign
rms. Thus, the governments problem in country i is dened
max
 i;i
WCNi = 
CN
i + CS
CN
i +  iq
CN
i + iq
CN
ej   exCNi : (2.10)
We consider a non-cooperative game where each country unilaterally make deci-
sion about the environmental tax and tari¤ to maximize its own national welfare,
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and ignores its impact on the other. This problem is done with governments
choosing their pollution tax  i and tari¤ i and knowing the reactions of both
rms in the second stage. Thus, the FOCs are
@WCNi
@ i
=
1
9
 
12i   6 j   7 i    j + 3i + 2j   4(a  c)

= 0;
@WCNi
@i
=
1
3
 
a  c  i + 2 j +  i    j   3i

= 0:
Solving the FOCs of the problems of both governments simultaneously, we nd
the equilibrium amount of pollution tax and tari¤
i =
1
96

167i   43j + 32 
 
i   2j
  28(a  c) ; (2.11)
i =
1
48

16(a  c) + 19i   35j + 16 
 
i + j

: (2.12)
As it can be seen from (2.11), @i =@i = (167 + 32 ) =96 > @
A
i =@i = 1,
therefore, as the rmsemission rates increase the home government increases
the tax level. And, surprisingly, this taxation is stronger as the rate of spill-over
rises. Futhermore, in the international competition, rms faces a stronger envi-
ronmental taxation compared to autarky. However, the governments reaction
to the incease in the foreign rms pollution is reduction in levied tax on his
home rm, i.e. @i =@j < 0. Also, interestingly, we can see that the equi-
librium level of tari¤ on imports increases with the domestic rate of pollution
production, i.e. @i =@i > 0. In addition, this tari¤ decreases when the foreign
pollution increases, @i =@j < 0. Furthermore, we can see that @

i =@ > 0
when j < i=2, and @

i =@ > 0.
Finally, the market equilibrium becomes
qhi =
1
96

52(a  c)  113i + 61j   32 
 
i   2j

;
qei =
1
96

20(a  c)  79i + 59j   32 
 
2i   j

:
Then the total output of rm i is
qi =
1
4

3(a  c)  8i + 5j   4 
 
i   j

: (2.13)
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Consequently, the negative externality produced by the home and foreign rms
in country i is
exTi = iq

i +  jq

j ; (2.14)
where T denotes the case of trade liberalization. Therefore, the global pollution
and the total negative externality caused by rmsproduction are
ETG = iq

i + jq

j ; (2.15)
exTG = (1 +  )E
T
G; (2.16)
where G stands for the global.
2.4 Trade vs autarky
In this section, we compare the autarkic equilibrium with the noncooperative
restricted trade equilibria. We want to know how the asymmetric pollution
spill-over makes some di¤erences.
2.4.1 Global pollution
Comparing (2.7) and (2.16), yields
exG = ex
T
G   exAG
=
1
4
(1 +  )
h
(a  c)  i + j  62i + 62j   10ij + 4  i   j2i :(2.17)
In the symmetric case where i = j = , we have exGji=j = 2 (1 +  ) (a  c  ).
Since from (2.2) we know that a   c     0, the total externality and globa
pollution in bilateral trade is larger than autarky. However, in the asymmetric
case i 6= j , there exists a range of parameter in which global pollution and
consequently total negative externality in the autarkic equilibrium are larger
than the restricted trade. In gure 1, for a given value of a   c, exG is de-
picted in the space of (i; j). In the region between the two curves exG is
positive, therefore, trade liberalization is detrimental for the environment if the
two rmsrates of emissions are almost equal. Note that the dotted line in this
and the following gures represent the points where i = j . On this points we
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have ETG > E
A
G , which is consistent with the existing literature with symmetric
emission rate.
Figure 1: Global pollution comparison.
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The region beyond the curves represents the points where ex < 0. There-
fore, for a wide range of asymmetric emission rates, trade liberalization not only
is not a bad news for the environment but also it could even make reduction
in the environmental damages. This result is contrary to the almost all of the
previous studies where they argue that trade liberalization leads to increase in
environmental pollution.
As it is shown in gure 1, as the rate at which pollution crosses borders,  ,
increases the region where the restricted trade is environmentally detrimental
shrinks. Thus, for a pure global environmental problem (i.e.  = 1) the re-
gion where international trade compared to autarky is environmental friendly
becomes even larger.
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2.4.2 Externality in home country
A part of the negative externality caused by polluting production is created
by the domestic rm and another part by the foreign rm because of having
transboundary pollution ( > 0). Therefore, in the case of autarky we still have
the negative environmental e¤ect of foreign rm activity. In order to compare
the negative externality in country i in the international trade framework with
the autarky, we should compare (2.6) with (2.14) which yields
exi = ex
T
i   exAi =
1
4
j

(a  c) + 5i   6j + 4 
 
i   j

: (2.18)
Figures 2: Negative externality comparison in country i where a)  = 0, b)  = 1=2, c)  = 1.
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It can be easily shown that in the case of international trade competition
environmental damages is larger than the autarky provided that i = j . For
the general values of emission rates, in gures 2, we have plotted exi in the
space of (i; j), for the case of: a) pure local pollution,  = 0, b) an exam-
ple of transboundary pollution,  = 1=2, and c) pure global pollution,  = 1.
In these gures, only in the regions between the two curves (in gure 2a, be-
tween the curve and vertical axis) trade will increase the negative environmental
externality in country i.
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2.4.3 Output
Considering (2.2) and (2.13), in gures 3, we have shown the region on the right
side of the ticker curves where rm i produces more in international competi-
tion. Thus, provided that the rm is pollution spill-over is su¢ ciently larger
than her rivals; her total production in the presence of international trade is
lower than the case of autarky. This is a very good news for environmental-
ist which even noncooperative environmental and trade policies make the more
environmentally ine¢ cient rm to reduce her production.
Figures 3: Total output comparison for rm i where a)  = 0, b)  = 1=2, c)  = 1.
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In the gures 3 and 4, the thinner lines represent the points where below
them qei < 0, and therefore, there is not any export by the rm i to the country
j.
2.4.4 Prots and welfare
Finally we want to examine the protability and welfare consequences of trade
liberalization.
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Figures 4: Prot and welfare comparison in country i where a)  = 0, b)  = 1=2, c)  = 1.
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Figures 4, in the space of (i; j), shows the regions inside the curves where
rms prot and social welfare of country i under the autarky are larger than
the ones in international competition. The lower curves represent the points
where rms prots in autarky and international trade are equal, and the upper
curves characterizes the points where the social welfare in autarky and trade
are the same. Consitent with the other studies, rms prots in the case of
symmetric pollution spill-overs decreases in trade liberalization. However, in
the case of asymmetric pollution spill-over, trade liberalization decreases the
rms prots provided that her pollution spill-over is su¢ ciently larger than her
rival in international competition.
In the case of pure local pollution, trade liberalization always increases total
welfare. As  increases the regions where rms prots in autarky is larger than
international trade shrink and the regions where social welfare in autarky is
larger than international trade expand. However, although in the presence of
transboundary pollution governments prefer autarky rather than international
competition when rms production functions are the same, they prefer restricted
trade where they use environmental and trade policies rather than autarky pro-
vided that the home rms pollution spill-over is lower than her rival.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we considered a two-country world model with a single polluting
rm in each country to examine the welfare implications of trade liberaliza-
tion when governments behave strategically using environmental policy with
asymmetric pollution spillovers. We investigated a second-best trade agreement
between two countries to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using
pollution taxes and tari¤s. We found that when the marginal cost of pollution
of the domestic rm increases, the pollution-shifting motive is enhanced and
government wants to raise production taxes and surprisingly the rent-seeking
behavior is observed and government raises import tari¤s. On the other hand,
when the marginal cost of pollution of the foreign rm increases, government
want to reduce the level of tax and interestingly the level of tari¤ as well.
Furthermore, it is shown that how the level of taxes may increase or decrease
when/as the rate at which pollution crosses borders rises. We also show that,
because of asymmetric pollution spill-over, the global pollution may decrease
after trade liberalization.
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Chapter 3
Non-Tradeable Pollution
Permits as Green R&D
Incentives
3.1 Introduction
The regulation of industries producing negative environmental e¤ects is a hot
issue in the current literature. Most of the existing contributions in the eld
of environmental economics examine the existence of Pigouvian taxation aimed
at inducing rms to reduce damaging emissions directly1 or indirectly2 (for an
exhaustive overview, see Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002; and Requate, 2005).
Another possibility consists in assigning rms pollution rights, which in turn
can be tradable.3 The latter, in general, is indeed a short run remedy that
in principle does not modify the nature of the production technology used by
rms, while clearly in the long run it would be best to attain new environmental-
friendly technologies.
A comparatively limited number of contributions investigate the link be-
tween some forms of environmental regulation and the incentives to generate
1See Bergstrom et al. (1981), Karp and Livernois (1992, 1994), Benchekroun and Long
(1998, 2002), Poyago-Theotoky (2007) and Tsur and Zemel (2008).
2To this regard, see Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Damania
(1996), Chiou and Hu (2001), Tsur and Zemel (2002) and Dragone et al. (2010).
3See von der Fehr (1993), Sartzetakis (1997), Tietenberg (2003) and MacKenzie (2011),
inter alia. For a modelization of the auction design for the allocation of pollution rights and
the resulting R&D incentives to abate pollution in a Cournot duopoly, see Sunnevåg (2003).
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and adopt green technologies or pollution-abatement measures.4 In particular,
La¤ont and Tirole (1996) argue that pollution permits diminish or eliminate al-
together rmsincentives towards green R&D because once a rm has acquired
the right to pollute then she nds it more convenient to leave aside any uncertain
and costly project eventually yielding a green technology. A qualitatively similar
conclusion is reached by Damania (1996) in a supergame where quantity-setting
rms aims at stabilising collusion while considering the feasibility of green R&D
project, being subject to Pigouvian taxation.
Our aim is to nest into this debate by modelling the interplay between the
costly acquisition of pollution rights on one side and green innovation incentives
on the other, so as to single out the possibility for a public agency aiming at
preserving the environment to design the distribution of pollution rights as an
instrument to foster environmental R&D. The mechanism yielding this result
can be intuitively explained as follows. Instead of modelling an auction for
pollution rights, we envisage the possibility that, in order to acquire them, rms
must participate to a lottery controlled by the government. If the outcome
of such lottery is the assignment of pollution rights to a limited number of
rms (say, one), the losers face two alternatives: the rst is to stay out of the
market, the other is to enter with a clean technology. In view of this, the
regulator may set up the lottery with this in mind, expecting to get two eggs
in one basket. That is, awarding, say, monopolistic pollution rights to a single
rm may not necessarily force the regulator to accept a suboptimal trade-o¤
between market power (and the associated negative price e¤ect) and pollution
abatement, provided that - with some positive probability - losers are going to
innovate and enter the market with new clean technologies. To illustrate this
perspective, we adopt a simple model involving two rms, that choose whether
to participate in the lottery or try their luck in an uncertain R&D project aimed
at the attainment of a green technology. We characterise (i) the equilibria of the
4See Jung et al. (1996); Denicolò (1999); and Scotchmer (2011). Montero (2002) com-
pares the R&D incentives across a number of possible policy instruments, including emission
standards and either auctioned or tradeable permits.
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game between rms, based on expected prot incentives, (ii) the consequences on
consumer surplus, and (iii) the social preferences over alternative scenarios. The
outcome of our analysis is that there exists a non-empty region of parameters
where social and private incentives are indeed aligned, in such a way that at least
one rm prefers to invest in R&D, so that it appears that assigning pollution
rights via the lottery can be taken - at least indirectly - as a means to drive
prot-seeking rms to invest their resources in green technologies even in absence
of taxation or subsidization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
setup. Section 3 briey outlines the problem from the consumersviewpoint.
In section 4, the rmsequilibrium behaviour is illustrated. Section 5 assesses
the social welfare consequences of market equilibria. An example based on the
Cournot model is contained in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
3.2 The setup
Consider a one-shot non cooperative game played by two single-product rms,
indexed by i = 1; 2, supplying a homogeneous good with the same marginal cost.
Initially, they share the same brown technology, whereby the production of the
nal output creates a negative externality in the form of polluting emissions.
We suppose that, to mitigate the environmental implications of this technology,
the government introduces a regulation according to which if a rm wants to
produce she must not pollute the environment or she has to buy the pollution
right which is sold by the government only to one rm. Therefore, at the outset,
each rm faces the following perspective:
 she can take part in a lottery for emission rights. The exogenous individual
probability of winning the lottery is p = 1=2, and the winner must pay
a xed fee F to the government in order to acquire the emission permit.
Since we may suppose that F is redistributed among consumers as windfall
money, the total e¤ect of these costs on welfare is nought. The loser incurs
a xed cost   to shut down and quit the market. Alternatively,
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 the rm may invest a given amount, K, to attain a green technology which
comes out of the R&D division with probability  2 [0; 1]. If so, she has
the right to produce as her technology is now clean. If, instead, the R&D
project yields no results, the rm, besides K, incurs a xed cost   to quit
the market. The innovation is patentable; in case both rms innovate,
the authority allows both of them to patent the new technology and a
symmetric green duopoly obtains.
In line with this setting, we have three cases: (i) both rms participate in
the lottery for pollution rights; (ii) both invest in R&D looking for a green
technology; (iii) one buys the pollution rights while the other invests in search
of the green technology. In all cases, the marginal cost of production remains
the same, the only di¤erence between the two technologies being that one is
clean and the other is not.
Therefore, denoting the participation in the lottery as L and the search for
a green technology as G, we have the 2 2 game shown in matrix 1.
1
2
L G
L ELL; ELL ELG; EGL
G EGL; ELG EGG; EGG
Matrix 1
Here, EGG, EGL, ELG and ELL are rmsexpected prots when both
invest in green technology, one of them invests in green technology and the other
buys the pollution permit, or both take part in the lottery, respectively.
Consider rst the scenario where both rms are participating in the lottery.
In this case, the winner becomes a monopolist and makes monopoly prots,
while the loser gets no revenues and also incurs a xed cost  . Therefore, the
individual expected prots in this case are
ELL =
M   F    
2
; (3.1)
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where M is gross monopoly prot. The non-negativity of ELL requires M >
F +  :
Alternatively, when both rms invest in R&D for a green technology, the
expected prots for each rm are
EGG =  K +  [(1  )M + D]  (1  )  : (3.2)
Expression (3.2) consists of the R&D cost and the sum of (i) monopoly prots
if the rm succeeds in innovating before the other and get the exclusive patent,
and (ii) gross duopoly prots, D < M , if both rms show up simultaneously
at the patent o¢ ce with the green technology to get it patented on parallel,
as it is rational for a smart government to have a totally green duopoly com-
bining environmental friendly production with the equally desirable of output
expansion on market price and therefore on consumer surplus.
In the third case, in which one invests to attain a clean technology and
one participates in the lottery, since the rm which takes part in the lottery is
the only potential buyer, she will obtain the pollution permit for sure and her
expected payo¤ is
ELG =  F + (1  )M + D; (3.3)
which depends on whether the rival succeeds in innovating or not. Accordingly,
the maximum willingness to pay for the emission right cannot exceed (1 )M+
D: In this scenario, the expected payo¤ for the rm activating the R&D
project is
EGL =  K + D   (1  )  : (3.4)
Hence, the game has a two-stage structure, where the rst stage describes the
rmschoice between taking part in the lottery or investing in green R&D, and
the second models market behaviour. Moves are simultaneous in both stages,
with complete, symmetric and imperfect information in each, while strategies
taken at the rst stage are observable to rms prior to playing the second stage.
The solution concept is subgame perfection by backward induction.
3.3. The consumersview point 46
3.3 The consumersview point
We shall now have a look at the level of consumer surplus generated by con-
sumption (and therefore gross of the redistribution of F ) in the three di¤erent
perspectives:
(G,G) In this case, the expected surplus for consumers is the aggregate amount
of the monopolistic consumer surplus if one rm innovates and the other
one does not, and the duopolistic consumer surplus if both rms attain
the innovation:
ECSGG = 2(1  )CSM + 2CSD; (3.5)
where CSM and CSD are the levels of consumer surplus in monopoly and
duopoly, respectively.
(L,G) or (G,L) If one rm buys the pollution permit and the other invests in
R&D, the expected consumer surplus becomes
ECSLG = ECSGL = (1  )CSM + CSD   (1  )EM   ED; (3.6)
illustrating the fact that depending on the probability of innovation, con-
sumers incur some amount of negative externality either in monopoly, EM ,
or in the asymmetric duopoly where only one of the two rms creates a
negative externality, ED(< EM ).
(L,L) If both rms participate in the lottery, one of them wins it and becomes
a monopolist with the existing brown technology, which obviously entails
a negative externality for consumers:
ECSLL = CSM   EM : (3.7)
By comparing these functions, we have
gl;llcs  ECSGL   ECSLL =  [CSD   CSM + EM   ED] ; (3.8)
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gg;glcs  ECSGG ECSGL = (1  ) [(2  1)CSM   CSD + EM   ED]+ED;
(3.9)
gg;llcs  ECSGG   ECSLL = (2 (1  )  1)CSM + 2CSD   EM : (3.10)
Since we know that CSD > CSM and EM > ED, it is easily shown that gl;llcs >
0 which means that consumers prefer the perspective in which one rm goes for
the green technology rather than that in which both take part in the lottery.
For the other two expressions, (3.9) and (3.10), we nd that as  increases
gg;glcs and 
gg;ll
cs increase monotonically and, for su¢ ciently large values of ,
they become positive. Therefore, while from the consumersstandpoint having
one rm investing in green technologies and the other buying pollution rights is
more desirable than having both involved in the lottery for the pollution rights,
consumers dislike the idea that both rms may disregard pollution permits and
to invest symmetrically in clean technologies unless the probability of successful
innovation be su¢ ciently high.
Having characterised consumer preferences concerning the strategi behav-
iour of rms, there remains to assess the pivotal role of the R&D cost K in
determining whether there exists a parameter range wherein social and private
incentives are indeed reciprocally aligned.
3.4 Equilibrium analysis
Here, we characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium solution of the non co-
operative game between the two rms, based on the examination of matrix 1.
The shape of rmsstrategic behaviour is essentially determined by probability
 as well as the relative size of costs F and K.
Considering (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), we have
gl;ll  EGL   ELL =
1
2
(F   M ) + D  

1
2
  

  K; (3.11)
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gg;lg  EGG ELG = F (1 )2M (1 )D (1  )   K; (3.12)
gg;ll  EGG ELL =
1
2
F  

1
2
   (1  )

M +
2D 

1
2
  

  K:
(3.13)
If the right hand sides of (3.11)-(3.13) are simultaneously positive, investing in
search of the green technology is a dominant strategy for both rms and (G;G)
emerges as the unique and Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium of the game. The game
is instead a prisonersdilemma with (G;G) as the unique but Pareto-ine¢ cient
equilibrium if the RHS of (3.11-3.12) is positive while (3.13) is negative. Inde-
pendently of the nature of the resulting equilibriium, we may compare gl;ll ,
gg;lg and 
gg;ll
 ; which results in:
gg;lg ? gl;ll 8 2 (2  ) ?
M   F +  
M   D  	 > 1; (3.14)
gg;lg ? gg;ll 8 2 ?
M   F +  
M   D  	 > 1; (3.15)
gg;ll > 
gl;ll
 always. (3.16)
The fact that inequality (3.16) is met over the entire admissible parameter space
means that if a rm nds that the case where she invests in R&D and her rival
buys the pollution right is more protable than the case in which both take part
in the lottery for pollution rights, certainly she prefers the symmetric green R&D
outcome rather than the symmetric lottery; therefore, EGG > EGL. In order
to assess the sign of the other two inequalities, in gure 1 we plot the two curves
2 (2  ) and 2 and the straight line 	. Depending on the value of , we
have three domains where the sign of the inequalities changes: (0; 1), (1; 2)
and (2; 1).
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For  2 (0; 1),5 we have gg;lg < gl;ll and gg;lg < gg;ll . Thus, if
F  K is high enough (i.e. the cost of R&D is su¢ ciently lower than the cost
of pollution rights) such that gg;lg > 0, both rms nd it protable to invest
in green technologies and (G;G) is the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium of matrix 1.
If instead F  K is su¢ ciently low such that gl;ll < 0, the equilibrium of the
game is (L;L). The remaining situation is where gg;lg < 0 and 
gl;ll
 > 0.
In this case, as it is discussed in Proposition 1, we have asymmetric equilibria
along the secondary diagonal in chicken game where one rm buys the pollution
right while the other invests in green technology.
In the region (1; 1), we have gg;lg > 
gl;ll
 . Therefore, if 
gl;ll
 > 0, the
unique and Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium is (G;G). Where instead gg;lg < 0; the
equilibrium is (L;L) and in (1; 2) this is a Pareto ine¢ cient equilibrium of a
5 It is worth mentioning that since 	 > 1, this region always exists. In the cases   >
M   2D + F or D  F , 	 could become higher than 2 and, therefore, 1 = 1.
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prisoners dilemma game. In the other cases (i.e. gl;ll < 0 and 
gg;lg
 > 0),
the matrix becomes a coordination game with the two equilibria on the main
diagonal of matrix 1, i.e., either both rms participate in the lottery or both
invest in search of the green technology. In such a coordination game and in
the region (2; 1), we have EGG > ELL.
The above discussion yields the following result:
Proposition 14 A chicken game, with EGL > ELL and ELG > EGG
and therefore (G;L) and (L;G) are Nash equilibria, may arise provided that  
and  are su¢ ciently large. Otherwise, only symmetric equilibria are observed.
Proof. Considering (3.11) and (3.12), we have
gl;ll > 0...8..K <  
1
2
M + D  

1
2
  

  +
1
2
F  1; (3.17)
gg;lg < 0...8..K >  (1  )2M   (1  )D   (1  )   + F  2: (3.18)
It is obvious that both 1 and 2 are upward sloping with respect to . In
gure 2, we plot the two curves 1 and 2 against .
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In this gure, as it can be checked from (3.17) and (3.18), at  = 0, we
have 2 (= F   M    ) < 1
 
= 12 (F   M    )

< 0. There could be an
intersection, ~, between the curves provided that   < M  2D+F , otherwise,
~ = 1. This yields 1 > 2 in the region (0; ~). Therefore, there exists a viable
range of parameters between the two curves, region II, where matrix 1 becomes
a chicken game with asymmetric equilibria along the secondary diagonal of the
2  2 game where one rm buys the pollution right and the other goes for the
green technology. However, in the vicinity of  0, in order to have at least one
rm investing in green technologies K should be negative, which is economically
inadmissible. Thus the probability of successful innovation must be high enough
so as for the rms to have an incentive to invest in R&D. Finally, in regions I,
III and IV we observe a pure coordination game along the main diagonal, as
both (G;G) and (L;L) are Nash equilibria.
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3.5 Social optimum
We are now in a position to put together consumerslikings and rmsincentives
so as to evaluate social preferences according to the expected welfare levels
arising in the three possible cases.
Since the pollution permit fees are going to be redistributed across con-
sumers, the social planner decides only on the basis of K (and not F ). Then,
the expected amount of social welfare in each case is as follows:
ESWGG =  2K + 2(1  )SWM + 2SWD   2(1  ) ; (3.19)
ESWLG = ESWGL =  K+(1 )SWM+SWD (1 )EM ED (1 ) ;
(3.20)
ESWLL = SWM   EM    : (3.21)
in which SWM and SWD are the social welfare levels (gross of external e¤ects)
in monopoly and duopoly, respectively.
By comparing (3.19), (3.20), (3.21) and knowing that SWD > SWM and
ED < EM , we can characterise social preferences in the space (;K) as in
gure 3.
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Figure 3: The upper and lower solid curves, respectively, characterise the points where expected social welfare levels in LL and LG(GL), and GG and LG(GL) are the same.
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This gure shows that social welfare is highest in GG, LG (or GL) and LL
if (, K) are such that the industry allocation falls in region I, II and III,
respectively.
Now, we have to ascertain whether the regions in gure 3 overlap, at least
to some extent, with the corresponding regions in gure 2. More precisely, we
are looking for conditions ensuring that the two regions labelled as II in gures
2 and 3 do overlap.
Proposition 15 Provided rms incur a su¢ ciently large cost to quit the mar-
ket, there exists a range of parameters wherein prot incentives yield asymmetric
equilibria generated by a chicken game where EGL > ELL and ELG > EGG
and such equilibria are also socially e¢ cient.
Proof. In order to prove the validity of this claim, it su¢ ces to observe that
there are innitely many admissible values of F such that the curves delimiting
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region II in gure 2 intersect the horizontal axis in gure 3 between the origin
and the curve dividing regions I and II in gure 3.
For illustrative purposes, in the next section we lay out an example based
on the linear Cournot model.
3.6 Example
Consider a market where 2 symmetric rms producing the same homogeneous
good with zero marginal cost c = 0. The inverse demand function is dened
as p = A   Q; where Q = P qi, i = 1; 2 and qi  0 is the individual output
of rm i. If rm i wins the lottery or succeeds in her innovation, qi is strictly
positive; otherwise she is not allowed to operate in the market. Accordingly, the
industry can be either a monopoly or a duopoly. Therefore, the optimal level
of output as well as the corresponding prots are either qM = A=2, M = A2=4
or qD = A=3 and D = A2=9, and the resulting social welfare levels (gross
of negative externalities) are SWM = 3A2=8 and SWD = 4A2=9. To model
pollution, we assume that the negative externality is a quadratic function of
output, E = bQ2=2. Hence, externalities in the two cases are EM = bA2=8 and
ED = bA
2=18.
Then, plugging prots, social welfare levels and externalities in inequalities
(3.12), (3.11) and (3.13), we get
EGG > ELG if k < f   (1  ) (9  5)
36
  (1  ) ; (3.22)
EGL > ELL if k <
f
2
  (9  8)
72
 

1
2
  

; (3.23)
EGG > ELL if k <
f
2
 
 
102   18+ 9
72
 

1
2
  

; (3.24)
where k = K=A2, f = F=A2 and  =  =A2.
Note that, in order for rms to have an incentive to take part in the lottery,
F must not be greater than D, i.e. f  1=9, as the rm participating in the
lottery may expect the other rm to come up with new technology.
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Figure 3.1: The gray aresa represent the regions where rmsstrategic incentives
and social incentives are reciprovally aligned. In (a)   is strictly positive, in (b)
   0.
By comparing (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21) we nd
ESWGG > ESWLG if k <
b(9  5)  (1  )(27  22)
72
  (1 )2; (3.25)
ESWGL > ESWLL if k <
5 (1 + b)
72
  (1
2
  ); (3.26)
ESWGG > ESWLL if k <
9b+ 54  222   27
72
 

(1  )2 + (1
2
  )

:
(3.27)
Now, we can perform a numerical simulations by normalizing all but two para-
meters. For instance, taking plausible values b = 1=5, f = 1=10 and  = 1=10,
we can plot k against  to assess inequalities (3.22), (3.23), (3.24), (3.25), (3.26)
and (3.27). The outcome is illustrated in gure 4.
In regions I, II and III; rms and the social planner alike prefer GG, LG
(GL) and LL, respectively. Therefore, it can be seen that, when   is not close to
zero, there indeed exists a viable range of parameters (area II) where we have
a chicken game whose equilibria are also welcome from the planners viewpoint.
This conrms our main point that using the instrument of assigning pollution
right through the simple lottery we have modelled here may indeed serve the
purpose of creating a side incentive for rms losing the lottery in the rst place
or deciding not to participate in it to take the alternative root which is to nance
3.7. Concluding Remarks 56
R&D e¤orts for green technologies.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
There are two main lines of research in modelling the abatement of polluting
emissions: the optimal assignment of pollution rights and the introduction of
corrective taxes or subsidies to internalize the externality and provide rms with
R&D incentives that otherwise would not arise spontaneously.
We have taken an alternative route to highlight the possibility that a mecha-
nism for the costly acquisition of pollution rights might actually turn the losers
into green innovators. According to our analysis, it seems indeed that controlling
pollution rights may exert - somewhat unexpectedly - some positive long-run
impacts on the environmental performance of industries by virtue of indirect
innovation incentives that can be considered as the side-e¤ect of the allocation
of pollution rights.
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Part II
Dynamic Cournot Oligopoly
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Chapter 4
Exogenous Output
Constraint in a Dynamic
Oligopoly
4.1 Introduction
Consider an industry consisting of N symmetric rms each producing a ho-
mogenous output. Then, the output levels of a subset of M (< N) rms are
constrained into a constant level. If the remaining rms simultaneously make
the best reply to this exogenous constraint, we want to investigate under what
circumstances is this to the benet of constrained subset.
In a series of papers Gaudet and Salant (1991a,b) show that, in the case of
Cournot competition among producers of perfect substitutes, a marginal con-
traction is strictly benecial if and only if the number of rms in the designated
subset exceeds the "adjusted" number of rms outside it by strictly more than
one. In the special case of linear cost and demand functions, the rms in the
subset will gain from an exogenously marginal contraction of their output if and
only if they outnumber the rms outside the subset by more than one.
In this paper we generalize this result to the case of dynamic competition
instead of looking at the one-shot game. While in the standard Cournot model
any output constraint is not to the benet of constrained rms, in this paper,
we show that when rms play a dynamic Cournot game with Markov-perfect
63
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strategies exogenous output constraint by a subset of rms results in: (i) increase
in the value of unconstrained rms irrelevant of the amount of constraint because
of having less intensive competition, (ii) increase in the market price for any
output constraint below the optimal level and slightly above that because of
reduction in the total output caused by less competition and (iii) increase in the
value of constrained rms for a viable range of parameters and initial conditions
because of increasing the price during the price path.
Our analysis has some applications to voluntary export restraints (VER),
Mergers, Economics Sanctions, etc. Mai and Hwang (1988) examine VERs in
a static duopoly model by using a conjectural variations approach. They nd
that if the free trade equilibrium is Cournot, a VER set at the free trade level of
imports will have no impact on prots. We show that if the free trade equilib-
rium is Cournot played with Markovian (subgame-perfect) strategies, then the
imposition of a VER at the free trade level of imports increases the market price
and the prots of the foreign and domestic rm. Hence, the VER is voluntary
in the dynamic Cournot model.
Suppose that the subset of rms represents rms that are part of a cartel.
Our study explains how it is to their benet when they agree on producing a
constant level of quantity, for example thier optimal steady state level of output
before the merger.
Consider the international market in which a group of countries are exporting
a specic good. Now, assume that one of these exporting countries is sanctioned
by part (not all) of the importing countries. This imposed economic sanction
force that country to be constrained to a lower output level which, however,
can be to her advantage. Our analysis characterizes circumstances under which
economic sanctions are not e¤ective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, present the model.
In section 3, the dynamic equilibria are derived before and after the exogenous
output constraint. Circumstances under which the exogenous output constraint
is protable is examined in section 4. In section 5, robustness of the result is
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checked by conjectural variations equilibrium. Some applications are presented
in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
4.2 A dynamic oligopoly model
Consider a dynamic oligopoly market consisting of N symmetric rms each
producing a homogenous output. Firms are assumed to produce with strictly
concave technologies described by the cost functions
C(qi(t)) =
1
2
q2i (t); i = 1; :::; N; (4.1)
where qi(t)  0 is the output of rm i produced at time t. The equilibrium price,
p(t), in period t is related to industry output by means of an inverse demand
function which in its linear version is given by
p(t) = a 
NX
i=1
qi(t) (4.2)
where the units of measurement are chosen such that the slope of the demand
curve is -1. Thus, the single period prot function of rm i is given by
i(t) = [a 
NX
i=1
qi(t)]qi(t)  1
2
q2i (t): (4.3)
Equation (4.3) represents a classical one-shot Cournot game. However, in this
paper we want to look at the continuous time dynamic competition where rms
are assumed to maximize the discounted stream of prots over an innite plan-
ning horizon with r > 0 as the constant discount rate. We are interested in
deriving Markov-perfect equilibria for this game. In order to solve for those
equilibria, we make use of the "sticky price" model introduced by Fershtman
and Kamien (1987). It is given by
maxi =
Z 1
0
e rtfp (t) qi (t)  1
2
q2i (t)gdt; (4.4)
subject to
_p (t) = s[a 
NX
i=1
qi (t)  p (t)]; p (0) = p0: (4.5)
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In (4.4) and (4.5) it is assumed that the actual market price deviates from its
level given by the demand function but moves towards it with a constant speed
of adjustment denoted by s (0 < s  1). Thus, we have sticky prices.
The strategy spaces available to the rms should be specied in order to
clearly dene the dynamic Cournot game (4.4). The assumption that the in-
dustry equilibrium is identied as a subgame-perfect Cournot equilibrium in
Markov strategies means that rms design their optimal policies as decision
rules dependent on the state variables of the game (in our case price). This
means that rms take into account the rivals reactions to their own actions as
expressed by the state variables of the game. This is exactly the characteristic
present in the case of conjectural variations equilibrium.
4.3 Dynamic equilibria
As motivated in the introduction, we are interested to see whether rms benet
from being forced to act non-strategically or not. To this end, in this section
we want to derive the dynamic equilibrium of game (4.4) under two di¤erent
scenarios. First, we solve for the equilibrium when all theN rms in the industry
are strategic players. Next, we consider the scenario where M strategic players
are eliminated by being forced to be constrained to a constant level of output
and we derive the equilibrium in this scenario.
If value of non-strategic rm increases compared to the unconstrained case,
the answer to the question is yes. This is what we focus on in next section.
4.3.1 Unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium
We derive the equilibrium of the model in which rms employ price depen-
dent decision rules when maximizing their discounted prots. Thus, changes in
the market price stimulate responses by all players that are reected in their
quantity choices. This corresponds to the recognized interdependence present
in oligopolistic markets.
Theorem 16 There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium of the sticky price
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model in an N rm dynamic Cournot oligopoly given by
q (p) = p(1  sK) + sE; (4.6)
V (p) = 12Kp
2   Ep+ g; (4.7)
and
p(t) = p + (p0   p)eDt; (4.8)
where p0 is the initial price and p is the steady state price
p =
a NsE
1 +N(1  sK) ; (4.9)
K, E, g and D are dened as
K =
2s(N + 1) + r  
q
[2(N + 1)s+ r]
2   4s2(2N   1)
2s2(2N   1) ; (4.10)
E =
 sKa
s(N + 1) + r   s2K(2N   1) ; (4.11)
g =
s2E2(2N   1)  2sEa
2r
; (4.12)
D = s[N(sK   1)  1]: (4.13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The results of Theorem 1 have the following implications. Firstly, the equi-
librium quantities of the innite horizon game do not coincide with that of the
one shot game if rms employ Markov strategies. Secondly, rms produce more
(and hence market price is lower) in the dynamic game compared to the classical
Cournot model. The interpretation of this result arises from the price depen-
dent decision rules (4.6). In particular, with an increase in price rms react by
producing more. To see why this causes equilibrium quantities to be closer to
the competitive equilibrium consider the following scenario. Assume that a rm
i nds it protable to reduce its equilibrium quantity. This causes the market
price to increase. Given the feedback decision rules of the competitors their op-
timal response to the increasing price is to increase their equilibrium quantities
thus o¤setting rm is action. This behavior causes in equilibrium all rms to
produce beyond the level of simple Cournot quantities.
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4.3.2 Exogenous output constraint
After having characterized the unconstrained equilibrium we assume that a sub-
set of M (M < N) strategic players are eliminated by being constrained to a
constant level of output, q (0 < q < a). Moreover, we assume that these rms
cannot deviate as they are constrained to these output levels. Thus, the game
played by the N  M strategic players in the model of sticky prices becomes
maxCi =
Z 1
0
e rtfp (t) qi (t)  1
2
q2i (t)gdt; i =M + 1; :::; N; (4.14)
subject to
_p (t) = s[a M q  
NX
i=M+1
qi (t)  p (t)]; p (0) = p0: (4.15)
This provides us with the following result.
Theorem 17 If a subset of M rms in an N rm dynamic Cournot oligopoly
is forced to act non-strategically through being exogenously constrained to the
output choices q, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium of the sticky price
model, where the remaining N M rms play strategically the dynamic Cournot
game, given by
~q (p) = p^(1  sK^) + sE^: (4.16)
V^ (p) = 12K^p
2   E^p+ g^; (4.17)
and
p^(t) = ~p+ (p0   ~p)eD^t; (4.18)
where p0 is the initial price and ~p is the steady state price
~p =
a  (N  M)sE^  M q
1 + (N  M)(1  sK^) ; (4.19)
K^, E^, g^ and D^ are dened as
K^ =
2s(N  M + 1) + r  
q
[2(N  M + 1)s+ r]2   4s2(2(N  M)  1)
2s2(2(N  M)  1) ;
(4.20)
E^ =
 sK^a  sK^M q
s(N  M + 1) + r   s2K^(2(N  M)  1) ; (4.21)
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g^ =
s2E^2(2(N  M)  1)  2sE^a+ 2sE^M q
2r
: (4.22)
D^ = s[(N  M)(sK^   1)  1]: (4.23)
And the present value of a non-strategic rm becomes
V^ C = Ap+ g^C ; (4.24)
where A and g^C are
A =
q
r   D^ ;
g^C =
q(D^(2~p  q) + rq)
2r(D^   r) :
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is important to note, however, that the behavior of the rms in the
subset after being non-strategic does not correspond to an equilibrium. The
strategically-playing rms, however, are in dynamic Cournot equilibrium.
4.4 Protable output constraint
Theorem 18 Assume that the subset of M strategic players are eliminated by
being exogenously constrained to the output choices q, whereas the remaining
N  M rms react strategically to this exogenous change in a dynamic Cournot
game with Markov-perfect strategies. This results in an
(a) increase in the market price for any q  q;
(b) increase in the present value of strategic rms irrespective of the amount
of q;
(c) increase in the present value of non-strategic rms for a viable range of
parameters and initial conditions.
Proof. See Appendix C.
However, the steady state price ~p could be larger than p even for some
values of q above the q. Consider q = q where  > 0, therefore, we have
~p > p () 0 <  <  ND^
Ms
  (N  M)D(a(1  sK^) + sE^)
Ms(a(1  sK) + sE) ;
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The expression in the right hand side of the inequality is always greater than 1,
for all plausible amounts of parameters. The thinner curve in gure 1 represents
the ranges of parameters in the space of (M;), for a given values of other
parameters, where the two steady state prices, ~p and p, are equal. In the region
below the curve ~p is larger than p. Therefore, the market price in constrained
equilibrium at every instant is higher compared to unconstrained equilibrium.
Figure 1: Protability of acting non-strategically for the rms in the subset.
On the dashed line  = 1 (q = q). On the thin solid curve ~p = p and
below (above) it, is larger (smaller) than p. Beyond the two thick solid
curves exogenous output constraint is never protable for non-strategic rms.
-
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In gure 1, in the regions between the thick curves, non-strategic rms can
benet from an exogenous output constraint. In the region II constrained rms
benet by producing more and selling them at a higher price at every instant.
In the region I, while constrained rms are constrained to a large output level,
they can still benet since D < D^ < 0 and, therefore, price in constrained
equilibrium moves to its steady state level more slowly. Region III, represents
the points where excluding some of strategic players from the game make the
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competition in the industry less aggressive and pushes the price up in such a way
that constrained rms benet even with a substantial decrease in their quantity.
Figures 2: Comparing the value functions of a non-strategic rm
before (V , the curve) and after (V^ c, the straight line)
the exogenous output constraint.
- -
- -
6 6
6 6
0 0
0 0
V V
V V
V^ c V^ c
V^ c V^ c
p p
p p
(iii) (iv)
(i) (ii)
~p ~p
pa
pa pb pa
































However, provided that the parameters characterize a point in region I, II
or III, the protability of output constraint depends on the initial condition
and how far the initial price is di¤erent from the steady state level. This is
shown in gures 2. In gures 2 (i) and 2 (ii), if the initial price belongs to
(0; pa) (or (pb; pa)), we can argue that V^ C (p) always has a larger value than
V (p). Whereas, in the case where p0 is outside the (0; pa) (or (pb; pa)) , output
constraining is not to the benet of the non-strategic rms in so far as p^(t)
arrives to the interval and it becomes protable afterwards. Figures 2 (iii) and
2 (iv) corresponds to the points beyond the thick curves in gure 1 and illustrate
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the case where constrained rms do not benet for any initial condition.
Note that, in our analysis, we consider general output constraint q > 0 and
examine the protability of it in a dynamic context. However, at the steady
state and for output constraint q = q, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 19 The steady state prots of non-strategic rms increase when they
are constrained to their equilibrium output level q.
Proof. As it was indicated before, after eliminating some strategic players,
the steady state price increases (~p > p). Therefore, since the output level does
not change, the rms revenue will increase while the cost remains the same as
before. Hence, the non-strategic rms make higher prots in steady state.
4.5 Robustness of results
We have shown that, in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly when rms employ Markov-
ian strategies, eliminating a subset of strategic players from the competition
can be to the benet of all the strategic and non-strategic players. Although
we make use of the sticky price model, results do not correspond to the price
stickiness. In this section, the robustness of results is evaluated through a conjec-
tural variations analysis.1 As it is shown in Dockner (1992), a static conjectural
variations analysis approximates long-run dynamic interactions. Hence, we are
interested in conjectural variations equilibrium in both unconstrained and con-
strained cases, and, then, examining the protability of being a non-strategic
player.
In the unconstrained equilibrium, all rms are strategic players. Firms have
symmetric prot functions given by
i = p(Q)qi   C(qi); (4.25)
where Q is the industry output, p(Q) is a general inverse demand curve and
C(qi) is a general cost function. First order conditions in the case of conjectural
1The conjectural variation is the rms conjectures about her rivalsbehavior.
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variations equilibrium are given by
@i
@qi
= p(Q) + p0(Q)qi   C 0(qi) + p0(Q)qi[
NP
j=1;j 6=i
@qj
@qi
] = 0; (4.26)
where @qj@qi is the conjecture of rm i about rm js behavior. The industry
output, price and cost functions are assumed to be Q =
PN
i=1 qi, p(Q) = a Q
and C(qi) = 12q
2
i , respectively. Thus, the equilibrium corresponding to the
F.O.C. of (4.26) is
qcv =
a
2 +N +  (N   1) ;
where the subscript cv denotes the conjectural variations equilibrium, and rms
are presumed to have identical conjectures  = ij =
@qj
@qi
. This conjecture be-
longs to the interval [0; 0] where 0 2 ( 1; 0) is the minimum viable conjecture
which solves  = pcvq

cv  12q2cv = 0, and  = 0 replicates the standard Cournot
oligopoly.
However, in a consistent conjecture equilibrium (CCE)2 , the conjectural vari-
ation must be equal to the reaction function. The rms reaction function is the
rms actual behavior and is dened by qi = i (qj) which solves (4.26). The
implicit di¤erentiation of (4.26) yields
[1 + (+ 1) (N   1)] @i
@qj
p0(Q) + p0(Q)  @i
@qj
= 0:
Considering symmetric reaction functions, @i@qj =
@
@q and equating conjectural
variation and reaction function, i.e. @@q = , the consistent conjecture is ob-
tained3
 =  N + 1 
p
5 +N (N   2)
2N   2 :
It can be easily shown that  2 (0; 0). Therefore, the slope of consistent
conjecture lies between  1 and 0 which refer to Bertrand and Cournot compe-
titions. Hence, in a CCE, the competition among rms in an oligopoly is more
aggressive compared to the Cournot.
2Consistent conjectures equilibrium is discussed comprehensively in Bresnahan (1981).
3There exists a second root which is lower than  1 and is not acceptable.
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Now, we want to know the consequences of excluding a subset of strategic
players from the competition. Let us force a subset of M rms to be non-
strategic players by constraining them to a constant output levels q where this
constraint is binding. Thus, the remaining N  M strategic rms solve the rst
order conditions
@i
@qi
= p(Q) + p0(Q)qi   C 0(qi) + p0(Q)qi[
NP
j=M+1;j 6=i
@qj
@qi
] = 0: (4.27)
Evaluating this rst order condition along the equilibrium of (4.26) yields
@i
@qi

q=qcv
=  p0(Q)qcv[
MP
j=1;j 6=i
@qj
@qi
] < 0: (4.28)
This, however, implies (given the second order conditions) that industry out-
put shrinks when a subset of rms is constrained to their equilibrium in the
unconstrained case. Hence, market price increases and both strategic and non-
strategic players benet, irrespective of the size of the M .
Now, consider a general output constraint q = qcv,  2 (0; 2). Assuming
symmetry between the N  M strategic players, the equilibrium output level of
(4.27) becomes
~qcv =
a (2 +N + (N   1) M)
(2 +N +  (N   1)) (N  M + 2 +  (N  M   1)) ;
and the resulting market price is
~pcv = a Mqcv   (N  M) ~qcv:
Therefore, the unconstrained and constrained rmsprots are
~ = ~pcv~qcv   1
2
~q2cv; (4.29)
~c = ~pcvq   1
2
q2; (4.30)
where ~ denotes the prots in constrained case, and subscript c stands for the
constrained rms.
Figure 3 shows the range of parameters in the space of (; ) where un-
constrained and constrained rms can benet from output constraint. The two
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Figure 4.1: Protability of exogenous output constraint in conjectural variations
equilibrium in the space of (; ). The lower curve and the upper one represent
the points where rmsprots in the two cases are equal for the constrained
and unconstrained rms, respectively. On the right hand side of the curves
both type of ms benet.
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curves in this gure are the locus of the points where rms have the same prots
in unconstrained and constrained equilibria. However, the gray area represents
the points where both type of rms benet while in the dotted area only con-
strained rms benet.
As it can be seen, rmsprots can increase even if they are constrained
to an output level higher than the unconstrained equilibrium. The protability
of output constraint decreases as rmsconjectures goes to zero. These results
are consistent with the results of the dynamic competition when rms employ
Markovian strategies.
In the gure,  = 0 corresponds to the standard static Cournot competition
in which any output constraint in not benecial neither for the constrained rms
nor for the unconstrained ones.
4.6 Applications
4.6.1 Voluntary export restraints
The study we have conducted has many applications among which voluntary
export restraints (VERs) is the most obvious one. It is of importance to inter-
national trade policy to answer the question whether domestic and/or foreign
rms benet from the imposition of so-called voluntaryexport restraints by
the foreign producer. If the foreign producers prot increases by restraining
export to the domestic market, VERs are indeed voluntary.
Dockner and Haug (1991) analyses VERs in a di¤erential game model with
a domestic and foreign producer of a homogenous good sold in the domestic
market. There are several di¤erences between this contribution and present
study. First, Dockner and Haug (1991) analysis is restricted in a speed of
price adjustment that goes to innity. However, in our model it is possible to
investigate price behavior in determining the protability of VERs. Second, with
the model presented here we can consider more than one foreign and domestic
rm which provides us the chance to examine the incentive for VER in relation
to the number of constrained rms and the level of output they are constrained
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to.4
In addition to Dockner and Haug (1991) that shows the imposition of a VER
at the free trade level of imports increases the market price and the prots of
all rms in the industry, our analysis implies that: market price increases for
any output constraint which in below the free trade level of imports; it is always
to the benet of domestic rms for any level of exports that foreign rms are
restricted to and nally in part (c) of theorem 5 it is comprehensively explained
under which conditions and for what level of output export restraint is protable
for foreign rms.
4.6.2 Horizontal Mergers and Cartels
When in an N -rm industry a subset of M rms is constrained to a constant
level of output, since there is strategic interaction among N M+1 rms rather
than N rms, the level of competition in the industry will decrease which is
always to the benet of unconstrained rms as it is proved in theorem 5. We
show when the subset of rms are constrained to q* which is their steady state
equilibrium level before the exogenous output constrained, the anticompetitive
forces due to an exogenous output constraint can be strong enough to benet
the subset of rms as well. Theorem 5 also discusses about conditions and other
output levels that being constrained to it can be advantageous for the subset of
rms.
The same story holds when we consider the protability of mergers and
cartels. Our model does not precisely t the horizontal merger problem in which
rms solve their strategic problem to determine the equilibrium output level.
However, in general, output contraction creates the same results that horizontal
mergers and cartels can create that are reduction in aggregate output, increase
in the market price and therefore increase in the prot of N  M outside rms.
Now, assume that the subset represents rms that are part of a cartel. Here, we
4For another contribution on VERs in a di¤erential game you can see Calzolari and Lam-
bertini (2007) who study the impact of VERs in a duopoly game with a Ramsey capital
accumulation dynamics
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can dene cartel as an agreement in which rms in the subset agree on being
constrained to a constant level of output (for example q) and as it is shown in
theorem 5, it can be protable for them. It is di¢ cult for antitrust authority
to recognize such a cartel in which a subset of rms is constrained to their
steady state equilibrium level before the exogenous output constraint. Dockner
and Gaunersdorfer (2001), Benchekroun (2003), Esfahani (2012) and Esfahani
and Lambertini (2012)5 using a dynamic model with sticky prices, investigate
the protability of horizontal mergers in the specic case of instantaneous price
adjustment.
4.6.3 Economic sanctions
Economic sanctions are punishments imposed on a country by one or a group
of countries due to various reasons. Economic sanctions may take a number of
forms including: embargo on exports, embargo on imports, nancial controls,
transportation and communication controls, sequestration of property, preemp-
tive purchasing and other measures. For extensive discussion, see Bornstein
(1968).
We are considering import restrictions from the target country into the par-
ticipants which attempts to reduce the target countrys foreign exchange earn-
ings. There is a debate over the e¤ectiveness of economic sanctions in their
ability to achieve its intention even if any import restrictions enacted by sanc-
tioners ensures income reduction in target country. However, our analysis can
address the question of whether sanctions can reduce the target countrys in-
come.
Suppose thatM rms in the subset represent rms in the target country. The
rest of the N  M Firms are outside the target country. Sanctioning countries
by enforcing import restrictions are the cause of exogenous output constraint
in the target country. Part (c) of theorem 5 explains how sanctions can be
designed by imposing countries in order to decrease the present value of rms
5They considered non-linear demand function and the open-loop equilibrium.
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in the imposed country through the level of output that they force the target
country to be constrained to.
4.7 Conclusion
In the case of static Cournot competition among producers of perfect substi-
tutes, output constraint is never to the benet of constrained rms. When rms
use feedback strategies, eliminating a subset of strategic players by exogenously
constrained them to a constant level of output results in: (i) increase in the value
of strategic rms irrelevant of the amount of constraint because of having less
intensive competition, (ii) increase in the market price for any output constraint
below the optimal level and slightly above that because of total output reduc-
tion caused by less competition and (iii) increase in the value of non-strategic
rms for a viable range of parameters and initial conditions because of increase
in the price during the price path.
APPENDIX
Appendix A:
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof is carried out for symmetric interior
solutions. We use dynamic programming. The Bellman equation is given by
rV i (p) = max
qi
fpqi   1
2
q2i + sV
i
p (p) [a 
NX
i=1
qi   p]g; (4.31)
where V i (p) is the optimal value function of rm i. Since the game is symmetric
and linear quadratic we conjecture symmetric, quadratic value functions
V i (p) = 12Kp
2   Ep+ g; (4.32)
which implies that
V ip (p) = Kp  E; (4.33)
where K, E and g are constants that need to be determined. Maximizing the
right hand side of equation (4.31) gives
qi = p  sV ip (p) : (4.34)
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Thus, the feedback rules are given by
qi (p) = p(1  sK) + sE: (4.35)
Substituting this last expression and using the quadratic value function (4.32)
into the Bellman equation yields
1
2p
2
 
1  rK   2sK(N + 1) + s2K2(2N   1)
+ p(asK + E(r + s) + sNE   s2EK(2N   1))
+ s2E2(2N   1)  sEa  rg = 0: (4.36)
The requirement that this equation be satised for all values of p implies that
K, E and g have to satisfy
1  rK   2sK(N + 1) + s2K2(2N   1) = 0; (4.37)
asK + E(r + s) + sNE   s2EK(2N   1) = 0; (4.38)
s2E2(2N   1)  sEa  rg = 0: (4.39)
The solutions to equations (4.37)-(4.39) are given by
K =
2s(N + 1) + r 
q
[2(N + 1)s+ r]
2   4s2(2N   1)
2s2(2N   1) ; (4.40)
E =
c  sKa
s(N + 1) + r   s2K(2N   1) ; (4.41)
g =
s2E2(2N   1)  2sEa
2r
: (4.42)
With the decision rules (4.35) the price equation (4.5) becomes
_p+ ps[N(1  sK) + 1] = s(a NsE); (4.43)
which is a linear rst order di¤erential equation. A solution to this equation is
given by
p(t) = p + (p0   p)eDt; (4.44)
where p is the steady state price
p =
a NsE
1 +N(1  sK) ; (4.45)
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p0 is the initial price and D is the constant
D = s[N(sK   1)  1]:
This constant is only negative, and hence the Markov-perfect equilibrium is
globally stable if we choose the negative root of (4.40). Equations (4.35) and
(4.40) to (4.45) give us the Markov-perfect equilibrium in linear strategies for
the di¤erential game (4.4) and (4.5) for any nite s. This completes the proof.
Appendix B:
Proof of Theorem 2: The Bellman equation of the problem (4.14)-(4.15)
is given by
rV^ i (p) = max
qi
fpqi   1
2
q2i + sV^
i
p (p) [a 
MX
j=1
qj  
NX
i=M+1
qi   p]g; (4.46)
where V^ i (p) is the optimal value function of rm i, which is an unconstrained
rm in the constrained case. Maximization of the right hand side of the Bellman
equation gives
q^i (p) = p  sV^ ip (p) ; (4.47)
Substituting (4.47) into (4.46) and inducing symmetry yields
rV^ (p) = p(p  sV^p (p))  1
2
(p  sV^p (p))2 (4.48)
+sV^p (p) [a  p M q   (N  M)(p  sV^p (p))]:
As with the unconstrained case, we propose the following quadratic value func-
tion
V^ (p) = 12K^p
2   E^p+ g^;
which implies that
V^p (p) = K^p  E^;
where K^, E^ and g^ are constants that need to be determined. Thus, the feedback
rules are given by
q^i (p) = p(1  sK^) + sE^: (4.49)
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Substituting V^ (p) and V^p (p) in (4.48) and collecting with respect to p, we
obtain
1p
2 + 2p+ 3 = 0; (4.50)
where
1 =
1
2

1  rK^   2sK^(N  M + 1) + s2K^2(2(N  M)  1)

; (4.51)
2 = asK^+E^(r+2s)+sE^(N M 1) sK^M q s2E^K^(2(N M) 1); (4.52)
3 = s
2E^2(N  M   12 ) + sE^M q   sE^a  rg^: (4.53)
The equation (4.50) is satised if expressions (4.51)-(4.53) are simultaneously
zero. This results to the following solution
K^ =
2s(N  M + 1) + r 
q
[2(N  M + 1)s+ r]2   4s2(2(N  M)  1)
2s2(2(N  M)  1) ;
(4.54)
E^ =
 sK^a  sK^M q
s(N  M + 1) + r   s2K^(2(N  M)  1) ;
g^ =
s2E^2(2(N  M)  1)  2sE^a+ 2sE^M q
2r
:
Using (4.49), a solution to equation (4.15) is given by
p^(t) = ~p+ (p0   ~p)eD^t;
where ~p is the steady state price
~p =
a  (N  M)sE^  M q
1 + (N  M)(1  sK^) ;
p0 is the initial price and D^ is the constant
D^ = s[(N  M)(sK^   1)  1]:
This constant is only negative and if we choose the negative root of (4.54) the
Markov-perfect equilibrium is globally stable.
The discounted present value of the constrained rm is derived from
V^ C (p(t)) =
Z 1
t
e r( t)[p()  1
2
q]qd ; (4.55)
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where V^ C is the value function of the constrained rms and p(:) is the price
given by (4.18). Substituting (4.18) in (4.55), we have
V^ C (p(t)) = ertq
Z 1
t
e r (~p  1
2
q)d +
Z 1
t
e (r D) (p0   ~p)d

; (4.56)
which results to
V^ C =
1
r
(~pq   1
2
q2) +
1
r   D^ (p0   ~p)qe
D^t; (4.57)
Thus, we obtain
V^ C = Ap+ g^C ;
where A and g^C are
A =
q
r   D^ ;
g^C =
q(D^(2~p  q) + rq)
2r(D^   r) :
This proves the theorem.
Appendix C:
Proof of Theorem 3: Looking at (4.10) and (4.20), it is obvious that K
and K^ have the same functional form with this di¤erence that instead of N we
have N  M in K^. Thus, since it can be easily shown that @K=@N < 0, we nd
that K^ > K > 0. We have the similar story to compare E with E^ and g with
g^. Substituting (4.10) in (4.11), we can show that @E=@N > 0. Thus, as the
number of rms decreases the coe¢ cient E will decrease. This together with
having the negative term  sK^M q in equation (4.21) we can argue that, as long
as q is positive, E^ < E < 0. With the same procedure we can show that always
g^ > g > 0. Therefore, comparing (4.7) and (4.17), for all values of p we obtain
V^ (p) > V (p). This concludes (b).
Considering (4.10) and (4.20), it can be easily shown that for all values
of parameters sK < sK^ < 1. So, comparing (4.13) and (4.23), we nd that
D < D^ < 0. Furthermore, looking at steady state prices it can be shown that
for q  q, the steady state price (4.19) is larger than (4.9). Therefore, it can be
simply proven that the price path (4.18) is greater than (4.8) which concludes
(a).
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Now, in order to examine (c) we have to compare (4.7) and (4.24). Since
V (p) is a convex function and V^ C (p) is a linear function of p, by equating these
two equations, we obtain
pl =
A+ E p(A+ E)2   2K(g   g^C)
K
; l = a; b; (4.58)
where pa > pb (if there exist any pb). Therefore, in principal, for positive values
of p, the two value functions may have (i) one intersection if the radicand is
larger than zero and g^C > g, (ii) two intersections provided that the radicand
has a positive value and g > g^C , (iii) one tangency point when the radicand is
zero, and (iv) no intersection when the radicand is negative. Therefore, having
a viable range of parameters for which acting non-strategically is to the benet
of rms mainly depends on the amount of (A + E)2   2K(g   g^C). Here,
we are interested in its positive values. Using a numerical analysis, a range
of parameters in the space of (M;) is depicted in gure 1by means of two
dividing curves (the thicker ones) where between them the amount of radicand
is positive and beyond them it is negative. Situation (iv) corresponds to the
regions beyond the curves. However, in the region between the two curves, we
do have a viable range of parameters for output constraint to be protable for
the non-strategic rms which corresponds to (i) or (ii). Figures 2 show (i), (ii),
(iii) and (iv) graphically.
The condition (iii) occurs in the limit where s goes to zero, because we have
lim
s!0
(A+ E)2   2K(g   g^C) = 0;
and, therefore, there is a single common point in V (p) and V^ C (p). Furthermore,
the slope of V (p) at pa = A+EK isV
0 (p) = Kp E = A, which is the same as the
slope of V^ C (p). Thus, the contacting point is a tangency point. Hence, when
the price does not adjust at all (i.e. s = 0), acting non-strategically is never
to the benet of the non-strategic rms. However, for 0 < s < 1 there is a
range of parameters where the non-strategic rms also benet from the output
constraining. Comparing the steady state prices (4.9) and (4.19) and prices
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driven from (??), we found that
p < ~p 2

(0; pa) in (i),
(pb; pa) in (ii).
Now, looking at (4.18), we know that p^ starts at the initial price p0 and moves
towards the steady state price ~p. Therefore, provided that the initial price
belongs to (0; pa) (or (pb; pa)), we can argue that V^ C (p) always has a larger
value than V (p). Whereas, in the case where p0 is outside the aforementioned
interval, output constraining is not to the benet of the non-strategic rms in
so far as p^(t) arrives to the interval and it becomes protable afterwards.
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